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The Positive Take on Nothingness: Transcendence as the 
Metaphysical Foundation of Individual Fulfillment 
 
Lauren Roso 
 
 
 Human beings are distinguished from other entities 
in the world primarily by the fact that the nature of existence 
is an issue for them. Human beings are capable of asking the 
question of being in the broad sense: Why does there exist 
something rather than nothing? What is being? What is the 
meaning of this being? As Martin Heidegger says in the 
beginning of his monumental Being and Time, Dasein 
(human existence) is distinctive in its material existence due 
to the fact that it is also ontological, in that the nature of its 
existence is an issue for it.1 Dasein, as human being, is at 
once an animal concerned with survival, while at the same 
time endowed with the ability to question itself, to inquire 
into the very nature of its being—it is transcendence 
embodied.  
 Since human nature is comprised of both physical 
existence and the metaphysical ability to question this 
existence—and act towards developing it—we are 
necessarily concerned with what it means to be one’s own 
self. Philosophy has recently found recourse in the natural 
sciences and has taken a more positivistic approach in this 
search for self-certainty and identity. Advancement in the 
field of neuroscience have given us detailed descriptions of 
the processes in our brains, and psychology has discovered 
common structures with which humans use to gain a sense 
of self. These developments in the physical realm of human  
                                                
1 Heidegger’s definition from Being and Time  
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existence have been of the utmost importance. With such 
progress, however, comes a tendency to overlook the 
metaphysical side of what it means to be a human endowed 
with the ability to question. In each of these empirical 
investigations, it must be noted that “the questioner is made 
part of the question...it is we who ask, here and now, on 
behalf of ourselves.”2 In other words, we are engaged agents 
unable to adopt a “view from nowhere”. As engaged agents, 
we always bring with us more to the investigation than we 
realize. That is, we ask the question given a specific context 
and have an agenda as to why we ask the question in the first 
place. As Heidegger notes, we ultimately ask these questions 
on behalf of ourselves. All philosophical investigation into 
the nature of personal identity can, in the end, be reduced to 
the question: “What does it mean that I, whatever ‘I’ is, 
exist?” 
 In this paper, I aim to restore primacy to the 
transcendental foundation of personal development and 
construction, as well as our holistic, phenomenological 
experience of such development. 3 If being is to remain an 
object of investigation, it is fundamental to note that the 
question of being implies the question of the nothing. By 
taking seriously this notion of nothingness, I plan to show 
that it is what allows anything to be manifested at all. 
Metaphysical concepts—concepts that reach beyond the 
scope of empirical investigation—such as nothingness, lack, 
and negation, allow for the continual development of human 
identity and the exploration of possibilities. These concepts  
                                                
2 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Basic Writings, ed. 
David Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993) 94.  
3 I use the term holistic to indicate the inseparability of subjectivity and 
objectivity in human individuals, and the engagement and dependence of 
individuals on their surroundings.  
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emanate from the primary nothingness, which is beyond 
empirical investigation and must be examined 
phenomenologically in our experience of its effects. It is 
because we lack and are hence tied to the nothing (as 
potentiality) in a unique way that individual flourishing is 
possible. By beginning with Heidegger’s primacy of the 
nothing, I plan to explicate how human autonomy, choice, 
creativity, understanding, and meaning are constructed on a 
metaphysical basis. Max Stirner then illustrates how such a 
process is enacted through the negation of a static ‘self,’ in 
preference for a dynamic, active overcoming existence that 
seizes upon possibilities. Such a theory is explicated by 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s theory of Will to Power, and can be 
extended beyond the realm of egoism by embracing Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic method of understanding. In 
the end, I hope that it appears clear that this nothing does not 
turn metaphysics into a negative nihilism, but, given the lack 
of a set truth that is to be sought, rather lends to the 
experience of individual fulfillment and freedom “the 
openness of Being as such and the brilliance surrounding 
whatever comes to light.”4 
 
Metaphysical Nothing as the Fundamental Precondition 
for Being 
 In order to show how the nothingness allows beings 
and possibilities to be revealed, we must first investigate the 
nothingness itself. We come to a dead end, however, when 
we try to objectify the nothing in order to investigate it: 
“The question deprives itself of its own subject.”5 We can 
not ask the question without turning the nothing into a  
                                                
4 Ibid. 91 
5 Ibid. 96 
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something to be investigated. Nor can we assert that the 
nothing is a complete denial of that which is, as logicians 
tend to do.  This assertion makes the nothing parasitic on the 
totality of positives. This cannot be the case, however, based 
on the very rules of logic. According to logic, denial is a 
type of understanding, and therefore the denial of all that is 
presupposes an understanding of the totality of what is. We 
are unable to grasp the world thematically as whole due to 
our finite nature as human individuals and our limited access 
to the world in its entirety. As is clear, it is necessary to 
approach this question from a different direction and grasp a 
fuller understanding of the nothing.  
 Dasein, as human existence, is by definition its 
“being-there” (da= there, sein= to be). Heidegger creates 
this term to capture the nature of human existence in so far 
as it is always found in a relational situation with others, and 
this setting is inextricably tied to its being. It is 
incomprehensible to disengage oneself from the world and 
grasp the world in its entirety—this overlooks the fact that a 
world exists only insofar as one is involved in it. Given this 
nature of human comportment, Heidegger suggests 
investigating this illogical nothing from within our own 
experience of it (phenomenologically). He claims that in 
every experience of ours, there exists a semblance of the 
whole to which each act is related. The whole, for 
Heidegger, is totalized by the ultimate purpose, the “for-the-
sake-of” with which Dasein is concerned. In every case this 
is ultimately the existence of Dasein itself.  Though we are 
primarily and for the most part unaware of this, upon 
reflection we see the relational nature of all our actions, of 
the “in-order-to” for which we undertake all endeavors. This 
pre-reflective conception of the whole of our relations and 
comportment is always accompanied with a feeling that  
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extends beyond a single given situation, in anticipation of 
the future and remembrance of the past. Heidegger calls this 
feeling a mood, or an overall, transcendental attitude. By 
finding ourselves in a particular mood, or as particularly 
attuned, we relate ourselves to the whole of our situation as 
we are concerned with the world.  Dasein, through its 
attunement to the world and relational web of actions, makes 
sense of the whole through its very existence. In Heidegger’s 
words, “having a mood brings Being to its ‘there’.”6 Now 
that the whole can be grasped, what particular attunement 
would allow for the revelation of the nothing?  
 Heidegger concludes that the basic mood of Angst 
brings us face to face with the nothingness in its nihilating 
act, wherein it allows for the revelation of what is: “The 
nothingness appears in Angst alongside that which is a 
whole.”7 The notion of Angst employed here is not its use in 
the vernacular sense. Original Angst does not take a direct 
object; this is the case with one of its modifications—fear. 
Rather, in this Angst, “we lose our heads with regard to the 
whole... we say ‘it feels alien to me’... all things sink into 
indifference.”8 We begin to lose hold over ourselves, and 
realize that we are unstable. Our finitude and contingency 
are revealed to us as the whole of our world withdraws. The 
nothing has its reality and existence only in so far as it acts 
upon our world through a repulsion of what is. It is a threat 
that every possibility will be annihilated. However, while the 
nihilating nothing repels the whole of what is, it also 
simultaneously reveals it to us.  In this definition, the  
                                                
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1962) 173.  
7 Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Basic Writings, ed. 
David Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993) 8.  
8 Ibid.  
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nothing remains part of the whole as the “reference to the 
sinking away of what it is as a whole” which it repels from 
itself.9  This activity is essentially oppressive for Dasein. It 
is only through Dasein’s transcendence into the nothing that 
“it emerge[s] out of the manifest nothing as such a Dasein in 
each case already.”10 The nothing, in repelling the totality of 
Dasein’s worldly relations, oppresses Dasein and allows for 
the future possibilities to be seen as that which may be lost 
through death.  
 We experience the nothing in a state of Angst solely 
through its nihilating power. It does not exist in the material, 
empirical sense, but functions only as something which 
Dasein can relate itself to, in anticipation, just as one relates 
herself to any future event not yet actualized. In this way, 
nothingness is analogous to the notion of imminent death. 
Dasein can experience death only “in a way of Being 
[related] towards death.”11 The nothing ‘is not’, just as death 
can never be explicated by anyone living. We can only 
encounter the nothing and death through our Being-towards-
the-end. If Dasein “is as an understanding potentiality-for-
being,” and death is the “possibility of the impossibility of 
any existence at all,” then death functions as the idea of the 
nothing.12  Nothing accordingly takes on the signification of 
the impossibility of any potential being: “Death, as a 
possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing 
which Dasein, as actual, could itself be.”13 This quote  
                                                
9 Ibid. 9 
10 Ibid.  
11 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1962) 277.  
12 Ibid. 274,307.  
13 Ibid.  
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references the double signification of the word nothing, for 
there is nothing left to be done, and there is the possibility 
that Dasein will ‘actually’ be nothing.  
 While this may sound like a grim prospect, it is 
instead that which allows for the revelation of possibilities. 
It is also important to note that Heidegger does not call for 
one to live continually in Angst. In fact, individuals 
primarily do not live in authentic angst, but because the 
nothingness functions nonetheless continually, possibilities 
are still revealed. Our comportment towards the end begins 
whenever Dasein does, for as human beings, we are always 
projecting ourselves onto things which are yet to be realized 
(our potentialities). Death is merely the final end of this 
projection into the future, and is always in some way within 
the scope of our comportment: “Death is a way to be, which 
Dasein takes over as soon as it is. ‘As soon as man comes to 
life, he is at once old enough to die.’”14 The nihilating of the 
nothing occurs all along but is only experienced in its 
totality through authentic Being-towards-Death. Authentic 
Being-towards-Death does not divert itself from the 
possibility of impossibility, but instead has an understanding 
of death in the sense that it is a “Being towards this 
[ownmost and non-relational] possibility without either 
fleeing it or covering it up.”15 Authentic Being-towards-
Death brings Dasein face to face with the nothing. 
Anticipation, the temporal counterpart to the mood Angst, is 
the mode of being which characterizes this authenticity, as 
authentic anticipation allows one to be “free for one’s own 
death…liberated in such a way that for the first time one can 
authentically understand and choose among the [actual]  
                                                
14 Ibid. 289. 
15 Ibid. 305. 
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possibilities lying ahead of that possibility that is not to be 
outstripped (death).”16 By anticipating the ultimately non-
relational, the prospect of immanent death, the relational-
totality of our existence is “repelled,” or stands out in 
contrast against nothingness. This repulsion allows our 
relational possibilities to come forward and be revealed. 
 
Transcendence and Mutability of Stirner’s ‘I’ through 
Internal Negation 
 The openness to possibilities revealed through 
Heidegger’s notion of the nihilating of the nothing leads us 
to another consideration when it comes to the formation of 
individuality and its fulfillment. As Jean-Paul Sartre claims, 
humans are unique in that they are both a physical, material 
substance and a subject who cares for its being and is 
capable of acting towards this end. In the case of human 
individuals, one’s objective nature and subjective nature are 
intimately connected and inseparable. These are the 
equivalents of the dual nature we saw in Heidegger, where 
the object is an ontic, factual being, and the subject is 
Dasein in so far as it is an open potentiality for being and 
always projected towards its own end (for its own sake). The 
problem with human nature, however, is that individuals are 
never wholly objective or wholly subjective.  Transcendental 
subjectivity, what sets us apart from our animal counter-
parts, always lacks. The existence of human desire is 
sufficient proof of this. While the transcendent subject is 
capable of surpassing the present, reaching into the 
nothingness, and realizing possibilities, because of this 
openness it lacks full positive being in the sense of a pure 
object. Given this fact, Sartre claims that human beings are  
                                                
16 Ibid. 308. 
  189 
 
therefore the foundation of their nothingness, but not of their 
being— “Human reality is a perpetual surpassing toward a 
coincidence with itself [as a thing] which is never given.”17 
Such a coincidence is possible only in death, where the 
transcending subject meets with its pure objective, material 
nature—the corpse. As we have seen, this is fundamentally 
impossible to experience. 
 Once again, we need not be discouraged by the 
inability to integrate these two different modes of human 
existence. Precisely, it is the lacking nature of the 
transcendental subject that allows for the exploration of the 
possibilities revealed alongside the nothingness. The original 
transcendence of the subject is not towards complete 
identification with an object, but rather towards another 
expression of itself as subject—“the missing [subjectivity] is 
the Possible.”18 Individuals strive for identification with an 
absent expression of itself as a subject which at the same 
time it both is (as potentiality) and lacks (yet to be realized). 
In order for an individual to attain the status of a pure object, 
all of its possibilities would have to be enacted 
simultaneously. This is precisely what leads to the idea of 
Supreme Being, or God. Nevertheless, it is through striving 
for this imagined wholeness that we hold ourselves into the 
metaphysical nothingness and actively construct our 
imagined ‘selves’: “The possible does not exist as a pure 
representation, but as a real lack of being which, qua lack, is 
beyond being. The possible is possibilized to the exact 
degree that the [transcendental subject] makes itself be.”19 It  
                                                
17 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York: Washington Square Press, 1984) 139. 
18 Ibid. 153. 
19 Ibid. 155.  
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is the responsibility of the individual to make itself through 
the exploration of these possibilities.  
 Perhaps the greatest proponent of developing the 
self, or in his terms, the ego, is German philosopher Max 
Stirner (1806-1856). Though cursorily taken as an egoist and 
a nihilist, upon closer examination, his writings can be read 
as an affirmation of development, change, and progress in 
the name of the individual. By realizing the authority of and 
upholding the essentially egotistic nature of the subject, 
Stirner embraces the implications of this internal 
nothingness by affirming the nihilating powers made 
possible by this internal lack lived by every individual.  
 The traditional critique of Stirner, originally posed 
by his contemporary Young Hegelians, and Karl Marx in 
particular, states that while Stirner vehemently opposes the 
idea of a stagnant, perfect concept that rules over 
individuals, a stagnant whole objective nature towards which 
to strive, he merely replaces theology’s “God,” humanism’s 
“Man” or Marx’s “The People” with an equally abstract 
absolute concept, that of the ‘I’. As West says in a recent 
book review, “Stirner, as Marx and his other critics retorted, 
succumbs no less to the “holy” [as a totalizing concept]—
namely, to the unique, individual ‘I’ that Stirner exalts above 
everything else.”20 This has led to Stirner’s most famous 
nick-name, bestowed to him by his fellow Young Hegelians, 
that of “Saint Max”. Similarly, Sidney Hooks argues that 
Stirner replaces the totalizing concepts of the past with his 
own, that of the ego. Since there is little textual evidence to 
show the importance of the remainder of society in Stirner’s 
schema—the remainder being the other egos other than his  
                                                
20 Thomas G. West, “Max Stirner’s Egoism Review,” The Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 18 (1980) 102. 
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own—I choose to take the argument in another direction. 
The basis of the misinterpretation, that of the sole 
importance of the complete ‘I’, lays in the false concept of 
the ‘I’ which his critics cursorily attributes him. As we will 
see, Stirner’s conception of the ‘self’ is a negative one, one 
which must continually be overcome in the favor of 
realizing new possibilities. Given the openness of his 
conception of individuality, Stirner allows for the 
development and nihilation of the stagnant self, as well as 
allows for the possibility of individual development to 
include contributions from other ‘egoists’ who are also 
striving to avoid essentializing terms.  Both Saul Newman 
and Caleb Smith read Stirner along these lines and apply his 
conception of individual freedom to notions of both solitude 
and solidarity. They argue Stirner’s theses both practically 
and ideologically, essentially refuting the assertion made by 
West at the end of his review, which read: “I once heard it 
said of Stirner that he could have been a character in 
Dostoyevsky’s Possessed. That still seems to me a fitting 
epitaph for a peripheral thinker whose work scarcely 
deserves the attention lately bestowed upon it.”21 To preface 
their discussion regarding the possibility of collective 
intercourse (to be taken up later in the paper), I wish to add a 
reading of his ‘I’ that would allow for this intersubjective 
receptivity from the outside. 
 Instead of suggesting a striving towards immortality 
or wholeness found in a perfect being, Stirner affirms the 
self-dissolving, nihilating transcendence that each human is. 
He acknowledges that each individual is an egoist, projected 
into the future for his own sake (Dasein) and bound to be in 
constant strife with itself as well with others. It is important  
                                                
21 Ibid. 103. 
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to note that Stirner’s egoist does not exist in isolation, but 
must develop himself within a given context, or a 
Heideggerian “there”. This strife found in society far from 
discourages him. Instead, he embraces this competition to 
further extend the individual’s power of nihilation and 
transcendence, seeing each instance as an opportunity for 
asserting individual will22. The egoist seizes the chance to 
nihilate his ‘own most’ possibilities and transcend them 
towards others: “[the egoist] exists only in raising himself, 
he exists only as not remaining what he is; otherwise, he 
would be done, dead.”23 This process is continuous and 
alone is what constitutes the essence of human life. When a 
human settles on some specific label, on some designation 
provided by either him or society at large, “then he has dug 
his grave.”24 Of course an individual is always determined 
by the situation in which he is a contributing part, but the 
point is to never let any designation become totalizing, 
where there is no room left to develop and live.  
 Destruction for Stirner is a constructive action, as is 
seen through his conception of the internal negation. He 
spells out the positive and exceptionally powerful potential 
contained in the ability to transcend possibilities—seizing 
upon some, nihilating them, and then seizing upon others: 
“But it is not the ego that is all, but the ego destroys all, and 
only the self-dissolving ego, the never-being ego, the finite-
ego is really I...I speak of me, the transitory ego.”25 Human  
                                                
22 As we will see later, this strife within society actually allows for 
deeper inter-subjective understanding, which in turn enhances the 
egoist’s individual life. 
23 Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own, trans. Steven T. Byington (New 
York: Dover Publications Inc., 2005) 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 163.  
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beings are unique in the fact that their lives are transitory 
and that they have the ability for dynamic change.  By 
embracing the implications of mortality, it is here that he is 
most closely aligned with Heidegger. Stirner claims that 
“only the [abstract, objectified concept] ‘man’ in me is 
immortal”, and being an ‘Un-man’, in the sense of an 
individualized subject endowed with transcendence, is 
possible for human beings by the fact that they are mortal 
and self-dissolving.26  Here one is reminded of Heidegger’s 
‘being-towards-death’, and how the mortality of Dasein 
allows an individual to pursue possibilities with meaning. If 
one were an immortal whole, one would be stagnant, void of 
meaning, and barred from any creative action. Due to the 
transcendental subject’s essential lack and power to 
transcend the nothing, Stirner is allowed to say “I am not 
nothing in the sense of emptiness, but I am the creative 
nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create 
everything.”27  
 Stirner’s declaration that “Nothing is more to me 
than myself!” has often been read as an endorsement of 
selfish egoism. It appears that he cares only for his self, and 
nothing more. However, this statement can also be read in 
light of the previous arguments. Stirner’s conception of the 
‘self’ is a negative one, as the ‘self’ is primarily defined by 
others through the consent on one’s part to the value 
judgments to which one is subjected. It is stagnant, inert, 
objectified transcendence in the same vein as the designation 
‘man’ is arresting, lifeless, and immortal by virtue of its 
inactivity and passivity (in short, a stagnant object). Keeping 
in mind this static view of ‘self-hood’, the statement reads  
                                                
26 Ibid. 157-159. 
27 Ibid. 7 
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that for the individual, the internal nothing, the potential for 
transcendence and possibilities, is always outstripping, 
always overcoming and transforming the stagnant ‘self’. 
The ‘self’ is a tiny abstract kernel taken in a given time slice 
that neglects the individual’s possibilities and reduces the 
human being to an inert object. The nothing, on the other 
hand, shapes life in an immanent way, drawing from the 
authentic concepts of past, present, and future. The nothing, 
always with more meaning than the stagnant ‘self’, is what 
allows positive creation out of one’s free possibilities.  
 
Creation vs. Stagnation 
Numerous parallels can be drawn between the works 
of Max Stirner and the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Though there is no evidence to show that Nietzsche was 
familiar with his works, both held that in order to battle 
negative nihilism, individuals must continually build 
themselves up through the self-overcoming that is the 
foundation of the Will to Power. In fact, Nietzsche holds 
transcending your immediate situation towards other 
possibilities as the essence of life: “All great things are the 
cause of their own destruction, through an act of self-
cancellation: the law of life, the law of necessary self 
overcoming, wills it so.”28 Here we see Nietzsche endorsing 
Stirner’s theory that whenever an individual stops 
developing (through internal negation) and becomes 
stagnant, he is no longer living in the proper sense. This 
leads Nietzsche to explore the concepts of creativity and 
reinterpretation as the ultimate form of self-expression and 
self-mastering.  
                                                
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas 
Smith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 135. 
  195 
 
 In an aphorism in The Gay Science, Nietzsche poses 
a dialog between two individuals: 
    
A.:  You are searching? Where is your corner and 
star within the real world? Where can you lie down 
in the sun so that an abundance of well-being comes 
to you, too, and your existence justifies itself? Let 
everyone do that for themselves—you seem to be 
saying—and let everyone  
put out of his mind generalities and worries about 
others and about society!  
B.: I want more than that; I am no seeker. I want to 
create for myself a sun of my own.29 
 
Through the response of person B, Nietzsche responds to 
those who hold his position as selfish and disconcerted with 
the rest of society. He does not call for narrow-minded self 
interest, but rather a continual creation of meaning that 
would, in turn, give meaning to the individual’s life. What 
allows for the continual construction of meaning is not 
limited to the physical world around us, but extends to the 
subjective, metaphysical realm of re-appropriation and re-
interpretation which can be imposed onto the physical 
world. This is how we arrive at a plurality of meaning 
provided by nature. As Nietzsche says, “in the long run, it is 
enough to create new names [significations] and valuations 
and appearances of truth in order to create new things.”30 In 
other words, what are empirically given things without the 
valuation assigned to them by human beings?  
                                                
29 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, ed. 
Bernard Williams, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 180.  
30 Ibid. 70.  
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Nietzsche calls creators of this sort ‘Intuitive Man’ as 
opposed to ‘Rational Man’. While ‘Rational Man’ is 
concerned with the Will to Truth, a will to create a rigid 
world that contains no room for reinterpretation and 
possibilities, ‘Intuitive Man’, by recognizing the fact that the 
human conception of nature is necessarily constructed 
through our employment of metaphor and language, instead 
exercises an undifferentiated Will to Power. Nietzsche 
praises “intuitive” creativity on the lack of its assertion that 
there is some truth at which to arrive. Such a lack 
encourages one to interpret, reinterpret, misinterpret, and 
basically play with the world we find before us. ‘Intuitive 
Man’ is still subjected to the false nature of the world, 
however, his intellect is “richer, prouder, more luxuriant, 
more skillful, more daring; with a creator’s delight it throws 
metaphors into confusion, shifts boundary stones of 
abstraction.”31 Instead of the Will to Truth as the basis of 
creation, the Will to Power and therefore the process of self-
overcoming can be exercised. A stagnation of overcoming 
and re-interpretation stands opposed to one of Nietzsche’s 
most central arguments: 
“… there is a world of difference between the reason 
for something coming into existence in the first place 
and the ultimate use to what it is put…[it] can be 
reinterpreted in the service of new intentions, 
repossessed, repeatedly modified to a new use by a 
power superior to it; everything that happens in the 
organic world is part of a process of overpowering, 
mastering, and that, in turn, all overpowering and  
                                                
31 Friedrich Nietzsche “On Truth and Lies in their Extramoral Sense.” 
The Friedrich Nietzsche  
Reader. Ed. Keith Ansell Pearson, Duncan Large (Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006) 114. 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mastering is a reinterpretation, a manipulation, in 
which the previous ‘meaning’ must be obscured or 
completely effaced.”32   
 
As human beings, we alone create meaning. We are capable 
of transcending the given, reaching into the nothingness 
which is potentiality, and creating values that structure our 
reality. Here again is an example of how metaphysical 
actions influence and affect our physical situations: “It is we, 
the thinking-sensing ones, who really and continually make 
something that is not yet there: the whole perpetually 
growing world of valuations, perspectives, affirmations, 
negations…Nature is always value-less…we are the givers 
and granters! Only we have created the world that concerns 
human beings!”33 
 
 
The Creation of Meaning and Being through 
Hermeneutic Discourse 
  As Nietzsche argues, this creation of being is 
effected through reinterpretation. Only by reinterpreting, 
creating meaning, and therefore actualizing our potentialities 
can we construct a sense of self. For Nietzsche, this is the 
only way to lift oneself up. It follows from this argument 
that the more interpretation and understanding we come by, 
the fuller our lives will be. This is consistent with Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s notion of the hermeneutic broadening of 
horizons, in which there is an initial disagreement between 
two parties which is resolved and mediated through  
                                                
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas 
Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 58. 
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, ed. 
Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 171. 
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hermeneutic conversation. Since meaning is gained and 
constructed through this interaction, it leads to the 
construction of a fuller sense of self. These horizons provide 
the solid ground for the actualization of potentialities, the 
context or “there” in which one is involved. It is at this point 
I want to return to the figure of Stirner’s “self-dissolving 
egoist” and his relations with others. Though Stirner says 
little of collective hermeneutic dialogue, I do not see how 
his endorsement of such a broadening of horizons would run 
contrary to his central egoism. Greater self-overcoming is 
realized through hermeneutic debate, in which the individual 
is engaged with something foreign and reincorporates it into 
his own sense of self, for his own sake. 
 Both Smith and Newman discuss the possibility of 
Stirner’s egoist reaching out of himself and engaging with 
others. Their discussion is taken up in a penal sense as 
Stirner touches upon the freedom of the individual within an 
authoritarian system, such as a prison. Smith claims “if 
Stirner is going to be put to use again, it might be against 
these very concrete institutions of solitude and 
unfreedom.”34 In such a setting of solitude, Stirner once 
again prescribes a turning to oneself, in which “what is in 
you is brought to light, is brought to revelation.”35 This 
seems to be another insular command to care only for 
yourself. However, if we acknowledge that Stirner has in 
mind a dynamic possibility for self-development and change 
as “what is in you,” we see that this does not preclude 
engagement and understanding of others. As Gadamer 
claims, this is truly how one grows and develops through  
                                                
34 Caleb Smith, “Solitude and Freedom: A Response to Saul Newman 
on Stirner and Foucault”, Postmodern Culture 14.  
35 Ibid. 
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coming up against what one is not. In fact, Smith himself 
points to the fluid ability of identity formation by noticing 
the peculiar structure of Stirner’s argument itself: “What 
saves The Ego and His Own from this stalemate is actually 
the work’s fitfulness, the shifty self-disruption of Stirner’s 
prose and line of thought. Just as the circle seems ready to 
close, there is a heave and another possibility breaks 
open.”36 Both Smith and Newman hold that perhaps there is 
a middle ground between individual solitary isolation and 
authoritarian control, one of “collective intercourse” in 
which individuals come together. Stirner’s essentially open 
sense of the self thus forms the basis for such a collective 
conversation. What would such a development involve? This 
brings us to Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutic discourse.  
 Gadamer reassumes the position held by Heidegger 
that “we always find ourselves within a situation… [where] 
throwing light on a task is never entirely finished,” and that 
this situation, by necessity, always includes others. 37 Our 
understanding always has a horizon which includes 
everything (and everyone) perceived from our vantage point, 
not only that which is both spatially and temporally near, but 
also that which is yet to be realized. Again we are held into 
the pure potentiality that is nothingness. Understanding 
begins with an initial conception “which is capable of 
projecting before itself a new projection of meaning… and 
this constant process of new projection constitutes the 
movement of understanding and reinterpretation.”38 In 
relation to Nietzsche’s nihilism, where there exists no set  
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer 
(London:Continuum Publishing, 2006) 301.   
38 Ibid. 269 
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Truth or Meaning, this illustrates Intuitive Man’s process of 
self-overcoming, since there is no limit to the “broadening of 
one’s horizons.” He is free to play with meaning and engage 
in hermeneutic reinterpretation given the openness of his 
being. Gadamer also holds that the self is not static, for if it 
were, no hermeneutic discourse would be possible—there 
must be room for development. He claims “this exploration 
of the ‘I’ as phenomenon is not exploring the ‘inner 
perception’ of a real ‘I,’ nor is it the mere reconstruction of 
consciousness…but a highly differentiated theme of 
transcendental reflection.”39      
 Charles Taylor, in his essay “Understanding the 
Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes”, 
further explains the volatile situation of an individual 
involved in hermeneutic discourse. He claims that in the 
end, there is always an “identity cost” that goes along with 
such broadening of horizons. The ‘I’ undergoes a change, 
and its ‘identity’ is thereby remade. One may recall Stirner’s 
proclamation: “But it is not the ego that is all, but the ego 
destroys all, and only the self-dissolving ego, the never-
being ego, the finite-ego is really I...I speak of me, the 
transitory ego.”40 Already we see a tendency in Stirner’s 
thought that would suggest openness to hermeneutic 
discourse. The key to reconciling Stirner’s egoism and the 
humanistic strivings of hermeneutic discourse is to 
reevaluate his notions of destruction and negation. Gadamer 
himself also uses “negative” language to express something 
very positive, as he “sees understanding as an experience of 
negation...wherein our previous sense of reality is undone,  
                                                
39 Ibid. 237 
40 Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own, trans. Steven T. Byington (New 
York: Dover Publications Inc., 2005) 163.  
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refuted, and shows itself as needing to be reconstituted.”41 
(282). According to Gadamer, it is a structural necessity that 
an understanding individual negate and reevaluate parts of 
himself. Stirner’s egoism, where the individual exercises 
unlimited self-overcoming through the shedding of his 
preconceptions and ideals, then appears to be the 
precondition of understanding others with whom you live in 
your Heideggerian “situation”.  One might argue that an 
egoist would not care to understand others around him, and 
that while Stirner advocates self-overcoming, this 
overcoming does not rule out a total disregard for others. 
This misunderstanding is due to the colloquial conceptions 
of “egoism”—one can easily overlook the positive outcome 
of Stirner’s open individuality. True egoism does not rule 
out concern for others if the ego itself is enriched by 
engaging with the others. Through a fusion of horizons, one 
“undergoes a shift” and “our horizon is extended to take in 
this possibility, which was beyond its limit before.”42  
 The idea of hermeneutic understanding does not 
figure solely in abstract philosophical thought. In practice, it 
has ethical implications in the realm of politics and human 
rights. When discussing the positive nature of Stirner’s 
egoism, Smith and Newman focus primarily on the 
identification among individuals in a common situation for a 
common cause. However, this identification is not enough, 
as there has to be an element of disagreement in order to 
work towards an understanding. Smith’s ideal “collective 
intercourse,” which he calls “the source of individual 
redemption,” does not come about through an egoistic  
                                                
41 Charles Taylor, “Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on 
Conceptual Schemes” in Gadamer’s Century.  Ed. Jeff Malpas, et. al. 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002) 282.  
42 Ibid. 287.  
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identification with the other, but results from an openness 
within the egoists themselves and their willingness to fuse 
their horizons in order to develop both themselves and that 
with which they commonly identify. This goal naturally 
changes and shifts as understanding develops. As Taylor 
says in relation to political rights, “coming to an 
understanding can never have finality...we see that what 
constitutes perfect understanding at one time may no longer 
hold good later.”43 
 The ability to pursue a fuller sense of self results 
from this lack of finality. If there existed some ultimate 
truth, or some static, infinite sense of self, individual striving 
would necessarily be limited. There would be a cap placed 
on Nietzsche’s Will to Power, and a limit to Stirner’s self-
dissolution. The Ego strives meaningfully because it must. 
To repeat Sartre, “the transcendental subject must make 
himself be.” Once the striving and actualizing of potentiality 
halts, the subject is “done, dead” and reduced to a mere 
object, no longer able to transcend his situation and project 
himself into the nothingness of potentiality. Though futural 
projection is always done on behalf of one’s self, with its 
individual end in mind, the striving is not enacted in a 
solitary egoistic cell, but is enmeshed in a situation, within 
an inter-subjective horizon of being. As Heidegger claims, 
human individuals are distinct in that they ask the question 
of being, the “Why is there something rather than nothing?” 
It is only through engagement with this question, and 
engagement of this question with others, that one is allowed 
to see herself as a dynamic striving subject, standing out 
against the background of nothingness. As long as 
individuals question the meaning of their individual being  
                                                
43 Ibid. 240.  
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they will continue to build themselves up, for “questions 
always bring out undetermined possibilities.”44                                                                           
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